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Abstract
Conceptual concreteness and categorical specificity are two continuous variables that allow distinguishing, for example, jus-
tice (low concreteness) from banana (high concreteness) and furniture (low specificity) from rocking chair (high specificity). 
The relation between these two variables is unclear, with some scholars suggesting that they might be highly correlated. In 
this study, we operationalize both variables and conduct a series of analyses on a sample of > 13,000 nouns, to investigate the 
relationship between them. Concreteness is operationalized by means of concreteness ratings, and specificity is operational-
ized as the relative position of the words in the WordNet taxonomy, which proxies this variable in the hypernym semantic 
relation. Findings from our studies show only a moderate correlation between concreteness and specificity. Moreover, the 
intersection of the two variables generates four groups of words that seem to denote qualitatively different types of concepts, 
which are, respectively, highly specific and highly concrete (typical concrete concepts denoting individual nouns), highly 
specific and highly abstract (among them many words denoting human-born creation and concepts within the social reality 
domains), highly generic and highly concrete (among which many mass nouns, or uncountable nouns), and highly generic and 
highly abstract (typical abstract concepts which are likely to be loaded with affective information, as suggested by previous 
literature). These results suggest that future studies should consider concreteness and specificity as two distinct dimensions 
of the general phenomenon called abstraction.
Keywords Abstraction · Abstract concepts · Concrete concepts · Generic categories · Specific categories
Introduction
Consider your kitchen table. This table is an instance of 
the category1 TABLE, which we label with the word table. 
TABLE is commonly classified as a concrete concept, 
because the specific instances that constitute the category 
TABLE (including your kitchen table) can be perceived 
through sensory experiences: Tables can be seen, touched, 
and smelled, among other things.
Perceptibility (Connell and Lynott 2012) is arguably 
one of the core dimensions of meaning that allow us to dis-
criminate what is concrete from what is abstract: TABLE 
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1 The difference between concepts and categories has been debated for 
decades within the cognitive-science and psychology communities. We 
refer here to concepts as mentally possessed ideas or notions, and to 
categories as sets of entities that are grouped together (as, for example, 
in Barsalou 1983; Goldstone and Kersten 2003; Goldstone et al. 2019). 
In this sense, the concept TABLE is whatever psychological state signi-
fies thoughts of tables. The category TABLE consists of all the entities 
in the real world that are appropriately categorized as tables. Please see 
the Discussion section for further elaboration on this matter.
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is a concrete concept because the instances that constitute 
this conceptual category and form the related concept are 
directly characterized by features that describe (also) per-
ceptual properties. Conversely, THEORY is abstract because 
instantiations that can be labeled with the word theory are 
not directly characterized by perceptual properties: An 
instance of theory, or simply, a theory, cannot be directly 
experienced through any of the senses (sight, touch, smell, 
among others).2
Consider now FURNITURE. The category FURNITURE 
encompasses subcategories such as TABLE (and more spe-
cific types of tables), as well as individual instances of tables 
like your specific kitchen table. A core difference between 
the two categories, FURNITURE and TABLE, is that the 
first is more generic than the latter. FURNITURE is not 
characterized directly by perceptual features because it is an 
encompassing category that includes a variety of subcatego-
ries (TABLES, COUCHES, CHAIRS, etc.) which, in turn, 
can be characterized by perceptual features (e.g., TABLE 
has four legs, can be made of wood, etc.; COUCHES are 
soft, etc.). As a conceptual category, FURNITURE is there-
fore more detached and more distant from fleshy perceptual 
features than TABLE. Moreover, FURNITURE is overall 
less rich of features than TABLE, because the latter is a 
basic-level category, while the former is a generic category 
(Berlin 1973; Rosch 1975; Rosch et al. 1976).
Both FURNITURE (generic) and THEORY (abstract) 
are conceptual categories that lack direct perceptual fea-
tures, and are, in this sense, different from categories such 
as TABLE (which is concrete and specific).
This paper investigates the relation between Specificity, 
defined as the gradable property that characterizes concepts 
on a scale from highly specific (e.g., concepts referring to 
individuals) to highly generic (e.g., concepts referring to 
groups or classes), and Concreteness, defined as the grada-
ble property that distinguishes concepts on a scale from 
being characterized by lots of sensory-based information 
(i.e., highly concrete) to virtually none of it (i.e., highly 
abstract).3 Based on these observations, it could be deduced 
that generic categories (e.g., FURNITURE) are perceived 
to be more abstract than specific ones, because they are not 
directly defined by perceptual features. The aim of our study 
is to understand and to investigate how Specificity interfaces 
with Concreteness.
In particular, we formulated the following research 
questions:
RQ1: Are generic concepts perceived to be more abstract 
than specific ones?
RQ2: To which extent does the distinction between 
abstract and concrete entities in the WordNet (WN, 
henceforth) taxonomy (Fellbaum 1998) reflect the con-
creteness perceived by speakers? And if the WN-based 
distinction between abstract and concrete is backed up by 
participants’ judgments, do the words within these two 
WN branches display statistically significant differences 
in their average degree of specificity?
RQ3: What type of concepts can be found in the four 
intersections of the two variables (Specificity and Con-
creteness)?
Through a series of quantitative and qualitative analy-
ses, we explore the relationship between Specificity and 
Concreteness and discuss the theoretical implications for 
a coherent theory of meaning that aims at decoupling the 
notions of concreteness and specificity.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: 
In the “Theoretical background” Section, we provide an 
overview of various definitions of the polysemous term 
abstraction, and show that two potentially different phe-
nomena are included and, at least in some cases, conflated 
within its general definition: These are conceptual concrete-
ness and categorical specificity. In the “Study 1” and “Study 
2” sections, we report two quantitative studies in which we 
operationalize and compare Specificity and Concreteness 
for a large sample of nouns. In the “Study 3” section, we 
report on a qualitative analysis in which we cross the two 
variables and describe which type of words appears in the 
four quadrants (highly abstract and generic words, highly 
abstract and specific words, highly concrete and generic 
words, and highly concrete and specific words). Finally, 
in the “General discussion,” we overview the results of our 
investigations and its implications within the cognitive-sci-
ence community.4
Theoretical background
Abstraction is a cognitive phenomenon investigated in 
different disciplines (see Burgoon et al. 2013 for an over-
view) and defined in slightly different ways. In cognitive 
science, it is typically defined as a conceptual categoriza-
tion process by which “knowledge of a specific category 
2 We specify ‘directly’ because various theoretical accounts, 
expressed especially within the grounded cognition framework 
(e.g., Barsalou 2008), suggest that abstract concepts can in fact be 
grounded in perception (and action, and emotion) in various indirect 
ways (see Bolognesi and Steen (2019) for an extensive and recent 
debate on this topic).
3 These two variables are defined as such by Borghi and Binkofski 
(2014), and discussed extensively in Bolognesi and Steen (2019).
4 All the materials related to our analyses are stored online on Open 
Science Framework (OSF): https ://bit.ly/2TWRO m7.
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has been abstracted out of the buzzing and blooming con-
fusion of experience” (Barsalou 2003: 389).
Barsalou (ibid.) distinguishes six senses of abstraction, 
namely:
1. Categorical knowledge (defined as the knowledge of a 
category being abstracted from experience);
2. Behavioral ability to generalize across category mem-
bers (defined as the properties of a category’s members 
being summarized behaviorally);
3. Summary representation (defined as the controversial 
cognitive bases of the behavioral abstractions provided 
in sense 2);
4. Schematic representation (defined as the controversial 
sparse representations that represent categories in mem-
ory);
5. Flexible representation (defined as the controversial idea 
that summary representations can be applied flexibly to 
many different tasks);
6. Abstract concepts (“when concepts become detached 
from physical entities and more associated with men-
tal events, they become increasingly abstract” Barsalou 
2003: 1178).
In this complex and highly granular definition of 
abstraction, abstract concepts are characterized as a 
type of abstraction from physical entities (thus suggest-
ing a definition in line with the categorical abstraction) 
that characterizes concepts more associated with mental 
events (thus suggesting a definition in line with conceptual 
abstractness). However, because it is a process that starts 
from experience, abstraction involves both abstract and 
concrete concepts alike: We abstract from experience to 
construct concrete conceptual categories (e.g., TABLE), 
and we abstract from experience to construct abstract con-
ceptual categories (e.g., THEORY). Yet, the process of 
abstraction may work in different ways for abstract and 
concrete concepts, given that the differences between these 
two types of concepts are backed up by several empirical 
studies, showing that words designating concrete concepts 
are more easily processed than words designating abstract 
ones in a variety of tasks, including word recognition (e.g., 
Strain et al. 1995), memory tasks (Jefferies et al. 2006; 
Romani et al. 2008), comprehension tasks (Kounios and 
Holcomb 1994; Schwanenflugel and Shoben 1983), and 
production tasks (Goetz et al. 2007; Tyler et al. 2000; 
Wiemer-Hastings and Xu 2005). Moreover, in language 
development, words referring to abstract concepts tend to 
appear later in children’s vocabulary, compared to words 
that refer to concrete concepts (e.g., Vigliocco et al. 2017), 
and neuroscientific evidence shows that the two types of 
concepts can be specifically impaired in brain-damaged 
patients, because their processing relies on overlapping 
but partly distinct neural systems (e.g., Binder et al. 2009; 
Hoffman 2016 for literature reviews).
In general, the debate on category learning and repre-
sentation has a very long history that taps directly onto the 
question of whether people represent categories in terms of 
an abstracted summaries, that is, prototypes (e.g., Posner 
and Keele 1968; Reed 1972; Rosch 1978; Smith and Minda 
1998) or as sets of specific instances (e.g., Brooks 1978; 
Estes 1986; Medin and Schaffer 1978; Nosofsky 1986). 
The two views critically differ in terms of informativeness 
and economy (Komatsu 1992). Prototype-based representa-
tions depend on maximal abstraction, and therefore have 
an appealing economy but they fail to provide the detailed 
information people actually use. On the contrary, exemplar-
based representations are established on minimal abstrac-
tion, and are therefore more informative and detailed, but 
not economical.
In a recent study on abstraction, Reed (2016) proposes a 
taxonomy of abstraction based on three senses of this term: 
abstract as the opposite of concrete (concept with no mate-
rial referent); abstract as the opposite of equivalent (abstract 
entity that includes only some attributes of multicomponent 
stimuli); and abstract as the opposite of particular (abstract 
entity that applies to many particular instances of a category, 
like a category prototype). These three senses of abstraction, 
according to Reed (2016), refer to different granularities, 
where the first applies to instances, the second to the attrib-
utes of instances, and the third to categories of instances.
Concreteness, instead, is a variable that measures the 
degree to which a referent in the real world is associated with 
a specific concept that can be perceived through our sensory 
experiences. For example, a table can be perceived through 
our senses easier than a theory, and therefore the concept 
TABLE is more concrete than the concept THEORY. Most 
published studies operationalize concreteness in terms of 
perceptibility, which is measured by means of human-gen-
erated ratings. These can be expressed as comprehensive 
scores of concreteness (i.e., how concrete is TABLE on a 
Likert scale, e.g., Brysbaert et al. 2014) or as scores express-
ing the degree by which a concept can be perceived through 
each of the five senses—sight, touch, hearing, smell, taste 
(i.e., to what extent can TABLE be perceived, respectively, 
through sight, touch, etc., on dedicated Likert scales, as in 
Lynott and Connell 2013).
Although Abstraction and Concreteness are theoretically 
distinct, one describing the construction of conceptual cat-
egories starting from experiences, and the other describ-
ing the perceptibility of the referents designated by given 
concepts, the polysemous nature of the term abstraction in 
some cases may suggest that the two variables are conflated. 
For example, Burgoon et al. (2013) provide an extensive 
overview of the different ways in which abstraction has been 
defined in the literature and then suggest their integrative 
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definition of abstraction as “a process of identifying a set of 
invariant central characteristics of a thing” (Burgoon et al. 
2013: 502). They then propose that abstraction operates on 
a continuum, in which:
lower levels of abstraction (i.e., higher levels of con-
creteness) capture thoughts that are more specific, 
detailed, vivid, and imageable (e.g., Strack et al. 1985), 
often encompassing readily observable characteris-
tics (e.g., furry dog, ceramic cup; Medin and Ortony 
1989). Higher levels of abstraction (i.e., lower levels of 
concreteness), on the other hand, include fewer read-
ily observable characteristics and therefore capture 
thoughts that are less imageable (e.g., friendly dog, 
beautiful cup). (Burgoon et al. 2013: 503).
In this integrative definition, the two variables that we 
described above are conflated.
The APA Dictionary of Psychology (VandenBoss 2006: 
4) provides three different definitions of abstraction.
1. The formation of general ideas or concepts, such as 
“fish” or “hypocrisy,” from particular instances.
2. Such a concept, especially a wholly intangible one, such 
as “goodness” or “beauty.”5
On these, the first two suggest that the same label may 
be applicable to both Abstraction and Concreteness as they 
have been described above. While definition 1 seems to 
refer to the process of categorization, a phenomenon that 
we operationalize through a variable that we call Specific-
ity, definition 2 refers to the perceptibility of the referent 
associated with a concept, a phenomenon that we opera-
tionalize through a variable that we call Concreteness. Both 
these variables are continuous, rather than binary, and while 
Specificity is a relational property that characterizes how 
generic/specific a category is, compared to other categories, 
Concreteness is an absolute property that characterizes how 
perceptible the referent denoted by a concept is.
Finally, in a recent attempt to clarify the relation between 
these two variables, Borghi and Binkofski (2014: 3) sug-
gest that “concepts as “animal” and “furniture” (on top 
of the abstraction hierarchy) are more abstract than “dog” 
and “chair,” but their category members are all concrete 
instances.” In this series of studies, we investigate the rela-
tion between the two variables: Specificity (which operation-
alizes the process of categorical abstraction) and Concrete-
ness (which operationalizes the perceptibility of a referent 
associated with a concept). We hypothesize that categories 
which are low in specificity (i.e., generic categories such 
as FURNITURE) are by definition more inclusive (Rosch 
1975) and therefore less rich in defining features, specifi-
cally in perceptual features. Being low in perceptual features, 
such generic concepts might also be less tangible, or less 
concrete, and therefore more abstract.
In Study 1, we investigate whether generic concepts are 
perceived to be more abstract than specific concepts, based 
on an analysis of a sample of 13,518 English nouns. In par-
ticular, we correlate measures of specificity based on Word-
Net (WN), with concreteness ratings elicited from partici-
pants in experimental settings. The measures of categorical 
specificity are extracted from WN (Fellbaum 1998), an elec-
tronic database that encompass various semantic relations 
between word senses, by using the hierarchical hypernym 
relation characterizing the noun taxonomy. As Miller (1998) 
pointed out, such hierarchical organization of the nominal 
lexicon, despite a lack of good theoretical explanations, cap-
tures valid linguistic facts. The way in which this semantic 
relation is formalized is actually a good proxy to operation-
alize Specificity. For the variable Concreteness, we relied on 
a well-known database of concreteness ratings judgments 
collected in experimental setting by asking people to rate the 
concreteness of given words (Brysbaert et al. 2014).
In Study 2, we build on the results of Study 1 and recast 
our analysis: Using the explicit distinction made in WN 
between abstract and concrete entities, we test whether such 
distinction generates two samples of concepts that are sig-
nificantly different from one another in terms of concrete-
ness scores (Brysbaert et al. 2014) and in terms of specificity 
(using our measures extracted from WN).
Finally, in Study 3, we cross specificity and concreteness, 
and provide a qualitative analysis of the types of nouns that 
appear to be highly specific and highly concrete, highly spe-
cific and highly abstract, highly generic and highly concrete, 
and highly generic and highly abstract.
Study 1
Method
WN is a large lexical database of English words created in 
the Cognitive Science Laboratory of Princeton University in 
1985. Entries cover the major parts-of-speech, such as verbs, 
nouns, adjectives and adverbs, and are organized via sets of 
cognitive synonyms, called synsets. Each synset represents a 
distinct concept—or, as stated by Miller (1998), an instance 
of a lexicalized concept—and is inter-linked to other synsets 
through lexical and conceptual-semantic relations.
Entries covering nouns in WN are primarily structured 
by two main semantic relations: (1) synonymy, and (2) 
5 Definition number 3 relates to conditioning and defines abstrac-
tion as “discrimination based on a single property of multicomponent 
stimuli.” For the purpose of our argumentation, we are not going to 
discuss this third definition further.
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hypernymy/hyponymy, or subsumption/subordination. The 
latter relation links more generic concepts to more specific 
ones (e.g., FURNITURE is a hypernym of a TABLE). The 
hypernymy/hyponymy relation, usually abbreviated as IS-A 
within WN-based studies (e.g., DOG IS-A MAMMAL), 
is hierarchical, asymmetric and transitive: All properties 
of superordinate elements are directly inherited by their 
subordinate nodes. It shall be observed that it is incorrect 
to consider the WN noun hierarchy as a single taxonomy, 
because, in various versions of WN, there are multiple top 
root nodes, which give birth to multiple hierarchies. In WN 
1.5 (released in 1995), for instance, there are 11 unique top 
nodes, or unique beginners (Miller 1998), covering distinct 
conceptual and lexical domains. In this work, we used the 
most recent version of WN, i.e., WN 3.0, as available in 
the Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) Python library (Bird 
et al. 2009).6 In this version, the top node ENTITY has three 
direct hyponyms: ABSTRACTION, defined as “a general 
concept formed by extracting common features from specific 
examples” (abstraction.n.06), PHYSICAL_ENTITY, corre-
sponding to “an entity that has physical existence” (physi-
cal_entity.n.01), and THING, whose gloss is “an entity that 
is not named specifically” (thing.n.08). To address our first 
question, whether generic concepts are perceived to be more 
abstract than specific ones, we first established how specific-
ity measures can be extracted from WN.
To calculate specificity scores, we relied on WN’s IS-A 
relation7 of the synset words, i.e., the words composing each 
synset. The basic idea motivating how we formalized our 
measure of specificity is the following: If we imagine WN as 
an upside-down tree, in which the top root nodes constitute 
the most generic concepts, and the nodes at the very bottom 
of the tree (or wherever a branch ends), i.e., the leaves, con-
stitute the most specific concepts, then the relative position 
of a concept within the tree (i.e., the number of nodes to the 
top root and the average number of nodes from the concept 
to each of the leaves) provides a good proxy, i.e., indirect 
evidence, of how specific a concept is, compared to all the 
other concepts represented in WN.
Specificity measures
Lexical resources that explicitly contain information about 
specificity as defined in this paper are not existent. Previ-
ous work in various branches of linguistics, including com-
putational linguistics, have focused on the interpretation of 
referents of nouns/noun phrases as individuals (specific) or 
kinds (generic) (Krifka et al. 1995; Mitchell et al. 2003; 
Poesio 2004; Reiter and Frank 2010; Louis and Nenkova 
2011; Friedrich et al. 2015, among others). Only in a very 
recent empirical study, Iliev and Axelrod (2017) address 
this issue. They proposed two measures to determine the 
abstractness—or better, the genericity—of a noun based 
on its position in the WN hierarchical taxonomy. Iliev and 
Axelrod (2017) distinguished two measures, one called pre-
cision, which determines the distance of a word from the top 
root of the taxonomy (e.g., the number of nodes between 
TABLE and ENTITY) and one called inclusiveness, which 
determines the distance of a lemma from its bottom leaves. 
This second measure quantifies the “amount of information 
associated with a concept. The more precise a concept is, 
the more information it provides, since all the information 
contained in a parent node is inherited by a child node, but 
the opposite is not true” (Iliev and Axelrod 2017: 717).
Figure 1 shows a virtual excerpt of the WN taxonomy. 
Lemmas C and E have the same degree of inclusiveness (i.e., 
distance from leaves = 0) but different degrees of precision 
(i.e., different numbers of nodes to the top root). Both meas-
ures contribute to determine the relative position of C and 
E in the taxonomy, and both carry information about their 
overall degree of specificity (intended as a combination of 
number of hypernyms and number of hyponyms).
For the purpose of our study, we wanted to determine 
the relative position of a word in the WN taxonomy with 
one measure, in order to make specificity comparable with 
concreteness (which is also expressed by one measure). We 
therefore need to combine what Iliev and Axelrod (2017) 
call precision and inclusiveness into a single measure. To 
achieve this goal, we designed three measures, which we 
describe and motivate below. A crucial aspect that led us to 
use three measures (instead of one) is the following. Speci-
ficity, as previously mentioned, is a relational property: A 
category is more or is less specific, in relation to another cat-
egory. Conversely, concreteness can be measured in absolute 
terms, as the perceptibility of the referent. Being a relational 
Fig. 1  Extracted from Iliev and Axelrod (2017: 720). A virtual 
excerpt of the WN taxonomy
6 We used version 3.2.2. of NLTK.
7 We have included also IS-INSTANCE relations.
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property, the specificity of a category must be measured by 
taking into account the specificity of other categories, within 
the taxonomy of category. However, from the perspective of 
cognitive plausibility we are unable to determine how much 
of the information provided by the categories in a taxonomy 
contributes to determine the specificity of one category. For 
this reason, we opted for three measures of specificity, each 
operationalizing the amount of information recruited from 
the taxonomy in different ways.
Our first proposed measure of specificity, based on a pre-
vious measure proposed by Resnik (1995), operationalizes 
the specificity of a word by counting the number of nodes 
between a word and its leaves, added to the number of nodes 
between that word and the top root. We call this measure 
Specificity 1, and we formalize it as follows:
where d is the number of nodes between a word and the 
top root node, N is the total number of nodes in the WN 
taxonomy restricted to nouns (i.e., 82,115), and n is the total 
amount of direct and indirect hyponyms of a given word. 
Note that n is increased by 1 to account for the node itself, 
and to avoid division by zero in case of final leaf nodes (i.e., 
nodes that do not have any hyponyms).
In case of polysemous entries, such as for the word “dog” 
that is associated with multiple synsets, e.g., “domestic ani-
mal” (dog.n.01 in WN), “frump” (dog.n.02 in WN), we 
decided to take always the first sense, or concept. We opted 
for this solution because most of the concepts in WN 3.0 are 
ordered using sparse data from semantically tagged texts 
(e.g., the SemCor Corpus), resulting in the most common 
uses of a concept (or, in other words, the most common 
senses associated with a synset word) listed above others.8 
Whenever a word presents multiple hypernyms (a phenom-
enon called multiple inheritance, which we describe and 
problematize in our second study), this measure follows all 
available paths up to the root node.9
Our second measure, Specificity 2, is a variation of 
Specificity 1, where the value of N in the original Resnik 
Specificity 1 = d + log ((1 + n)∕N)
(1995) formula is not the total number of nodes within WN, 
but instead it is restricted to the total number of nodes in 
the two taxonomy branches displaying ABSTRACTION 
(abstraction.n.06) or PHYSICAL_ENTITY (physical_
entity.n.01) as top root nodes. For instance, for “dog,” whose 
first sense, dog.n.01, ends at PHYSICAL_ENTITY, the 
value of N at the denominator is the total number of nodes 
in the taxonomy, i.e., synsets that have as a top node PHYSI-
CAL_ENTITY, i.e., 39,555. On the other hand, for “incep-
tion,” whose first sense, inception.n.01, ends at ABSTRAC-
TION, the value of N at the denominator is 38,668.
Finally, we operationalized one additional measure of 
specificity, in which we aimed at simplifying the calcula-
tions as much as possible, taking into account the overall 
total depth of WN, instead of the number of hyponyms of 
each word. Specificity 3 returns the specificity score of 
each entry by dividing the amount of direct and indirect 
hypernyms of a target word by the maximum depth of the 
WN noun taxonomy, i.e., the maximum distance from the 
ENTITY root node to a leaf. The formula for Specificity 3 is:
where d is the total amount of direct and indirect hyper-
nyms of a target word and 20 is the maximum distance (i.e., 
depth) of a synset word from the ENTITY top node. Note 
that dividing d by the maximum length of the noun tax-
onomy enables us to compare nodes in different paths of 
the taxonomy and, most importantly, to compensate for the 
possibility that all leaf nodes may result in having the same 
Specificity score regardless of their actual position in the 
taxonomy.10
Specificity 3 = (1 + d)∕20
8 Concepts represented by synsets words that do not appear in such 
semantically annotated resources are ordered randomly.
9 Iliev and Axelrod (2017) took the average values of the inclusive-
ness scores for each synset node associated with a target synset word 
in case of polysemous entries. This means, for instance, that in the 
case of the word “dog” (dog.n.01), that has two hypernyms nodes 
“domestic animal” and “canine,” they followed the path of “canine,” 
as it is the most informative (i.e., the longest). Moreover, because the 
synset word “dog” is polysemous (it is associated with seven differ-
ent synsets), their inclusiveness score is given by the average of the 
inclusiveness score of each synset. We, however, consider misleading 
taking the average of the senses, for each concept, because the differ-
ent senses may be at very different positions in the taxonomy, thus 
resulting in biased scores.
10 The main difference between Specificity 1 (and Specificity 2, 
which is a derived version) and Specificity 3, which we developed, is 
the following. Specificity 1 takes into account: the number of nodes 
to the top root node (hypernyms), the total number of hyponyms, 
until they reach the leaves, and the total number of nodes in the whole 
WordNet taxonomy. This implies that the specificity measure for the 
term dog, for example, is determined by nodes like canine, carnivore, 
mammal, vertebrate, animal, and organism (hypernyms) as much as 
by (dozens and dozens of) hyponymic nodes like puppy, poach, cur, 
feist, lap-dog, Chihuahua, Japanese spaniel, Maltese dog, Pekinese, 
hound, Afghan hound, basset, and so forth. We suspect that such 
measure may give too much weight to the number of (direct as well 
as indirect) hyponyms that constitute the lower (i.e., more specific) 
part of the taxonomy, from a node like dog to each and every possible 
leaf node that it may have in the taxonomy. Thus, we formulate Speci-
ficity 3, which considers the distance from a node to its top root node, 
and the total depth of the taxonomy (20 nodes) rather than the num-
ber of nodes in the whole WordNet taxonomy and the highly variable 
number of nodes existing under each node (e.g., from dog to any of 




The database of concreteness ratings collected by Brysbaert 
and colleagues encompasses 15,030 lemmas labeled as 
nouns. Of these, only 13,518 can be retrieved in WN using 
the three specificity measures, and worked as a basis for our 
studies. In particular, they were all used for Study 1. The 
remaining roughly 2 K either are not attested in WN, or can-
not be properly weighted using our measures of specificity.
Procedure
For the 13,518 WN nouns for which a concreteness score 
was available in the database by Brysbaert et al. (2014), we 
calculated the degree of specificity, using the three different 
measures described above. The specificity scores were then 
normalized into a 5-points scale, to better compare them 
with Brysbaert’s concreteness scores, which have been 
measured on 5-points Likert scales.
Next, we checked whether the data were normally distrib-
uted. Both a visual inspection of the histograms (see Fig. 2) 
and QQ plots, and indications of skewness (concreteness: 
− 0.338; specificity 1: − 0.188; specificity 2: − 0.325; speci-
ficity 3: 0.747) and kurtosis (concreteness: 1.867; specificity 
1: 4.400 specificity 2: 4.493; specificity 3: 4.182) indicated 
that the normality assumptions were violated in all four vari-
ables. The high kurtosis values indicate that our variables 
have heavy tails. In such situations, Spearman’s correlation 
coefficients are preferred over traditional Pearson correlation 
coefficients (de Winter et al. 2016). To facilitate compari-
son with other studies, we also present Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients.
We thus subsequently calculated the correlation between 
each of the three specificity measures illustrated in “Speci-
ficity measures” section and the concreteness judgments. 
This analysis demonstrates the degree to which each spec-
ificity measure on its own is related to concreteness, and 
shows the degree of overlap between the two dimensions 
of abstraction.




Table 1 reports the average concreteness and the average 
specificity measures for the sample of 13,518 nouns ana-
lyzed, and the correlations between the concreteness scores 
and the three measures of specificity.
As Table 1 shows, the average concreteness of the 13 K 
nouns is roughly in the middle of the 5-points Likert scale 
of the database, slightly skewed toward high concreteness. 
The average specificity obtained with the three measures 
is more varied: Specificity 1 and Specificity 2 are slightly 
more skewed toward the pole of specificity, while Specificity 
3 is more skewed toward the pole of genericity, in relation 
to the 5-point scales on which such measures were normal-
ized (1 being highly generic and 5 being highly specific, 
see also Fig. 2). The Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation 
coefficients of each of the three specificity measures with 
the concreteness ratings are weak, although positive (Evans, 
1996). However, when analyzing the correlations in terms 
of effect sizes (Cohen 1992), the results are differentiated as 
Specificity 1 and Specificity 2 have a small–medium effect, 
while Specificity 3 has a medium–high effect size.
Next, we wanted to explore whether the three specificity 
measures were comparable, or explained unique parts of the 
variance in the relation with concreteness ratings. However, 
Pearson correlation coefficients between the three specificity 
measures were very high (see Table 1). Due to these high 
correlation coefficients between the three different specific-
ity measures, we could not estimate a reliable regression 
model that contained more than one of the specificity meas-
ures.11 This suggests that the three specificity measures may 
be rather comparable.
Discussion
Our first general research question is whether there is a sig-
nificant correlation between specificity and concreteness, 
and whether, in particular, generic concepts are perceived 
to be less concrete than specific ones.
Based on three measures of specificity, which we partially 
retrieved from the literature and partially constructed based 
on our research goals, we observed relatively low correla-
tions between the variables of concreteness and specificity: 
The specificity of a concept (i.e., its hierarchical position 
within a lexical taxonomy) only has a relatively small rela-
tion to its perceived concreteness. The two phenomena seem 
to be mostly independent from one another, at least when we 
operationalize abstractness by means of scores of perceived 
concreteness by humans, and abstraction by means of hyper-
nym relations encoded in WN.
However, some properties of WN might have influenced 
our results. WN treats some aspects related to the polysemy 
of the IS-A relations (Wierzbieka 1984, Miller 1998) in a 
peculiar way by attributing multiple hypernyms to the same 
word sense. Multiple inheritance is not a problem per sé as 
it is a way of addressing the polysemy of the hypernym rela-
tion. However, in some cases the multiple inheritance gives 
rise to a “tangled” taxonomy (Fahlman 1979) by connecting 
a concept to multiple hypernyms that feed into branches of 
WN that are not ontologically compatible. For instance, as 
Table 1  Average concreteness and specificity scores for the 13 K nouns analyzed and Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation coefficients between 





Specificity 1 (WN) Specificity 2 (WN) Specificity 3 (WN)








Pearson’s/Spearman’s correlation coefficients with the 
Brysbaert et al. (2014) concreteness scores






Pearson’s/Spearman’s correlation coefficients with the 
Specificity 1 (WN) scores




Pearson’s/Spearman’s correlation coefficients with the 
Specificity 2 (WN) scores
– – – r = 0.822/0.842,
p < .001
11 We also verified this in a regression model: When entering all 
three specificity measures in a regression simultaneously, we received 
red flags on multicollinearity, especially in relation with Specificity 
1 and Specificity 2, which had very high loadings on the same eigen-
value (Specificity 1: 0.988; Specificity 2: 0.974; VIF Specificity 1: 
50.484; VIF Specificity 2: 44.023). Subsequently, we estimated a 
regression model with only Specificity 1 and Specificity 3 as predic-
tors of concreteness (and Specificity 2 left out). In this case, the VIF 
dropped considerably to 3.541 which suggests that the regression may 
still be biased (Field, 2013, p. 325). Furthermore, both specificity 
measures still have very high loadings on the same eigenvalue (Speci-
ficity 1: 1.00; Specificity 3: 0.717), which further suggests multicol-
linearity. A regression model with Specificity 2 and Specificity 3 as 
predictors showed similar results: VIF = 3.09, but both measures had 




reported in Verdezoto and Vieu (2011), in version 3.0 of 
WN, the first synset of LETTER (letter.n.01) inherits the 
physical aspect meaning from its hypernym “document” 
(document.n.02), which has PHYSICAL_ENTITY at the 
final top root node, as well as the abstract meaning (the 
content of a written letter), which links to the hypernym 
“text” (text.n.01), which in turn ends with the root node 
ABSTRACTION. The two higher hypernyms (PHYSI-
CAL_ENTITY and ABSTRACTION) are not ontologically 
compatible for the same word sense (the first synset of LET-
TER). For the purpose of our investigation, which focuses 
on specificity as well as concreteness, words referring to 
concepts that are listed in WN as both abstract and concrete 
are problematic: They constitute a technical problem for 
calculating the specificity measures as well as a theoretical 
problem (concepts being both abstract and concrete). We 
took these peculiarities into account and recast our analyses 
in Study 2.
Study 2
In this second study, we investigated whether the nouns that 
are listed either as abstract or as concrete in WN, that is, 
under the nodes ABSTRACTION or PHYSICAL_ENTITY, 
have significantly different degrees of concreteness and 
specificity.12 If the words listed under PHYSICAL_ENTITY 
prove to be significantly more concrete than those under 
ABSTRACTION (in terms of concreteness ratings elicited 
from speakers), then, according to our initial hypothesis, we 
would expect them to be also significantly more specific.
Materials and procedure
To operationalize this question, we first compared the list 
of nouns used in Study 1 with those appearing within each 
of the two WN branches, and retained only those nouns 
that appeared under one of the two nodes, i.e., ABSTRAC-
TION or PHYSICAL_ENTITY, removing any possible 
cases of words with multiple inheritance. This means that 
we excluded all cases of multiple inheritance appearing 
in ontologically compatible branches (e.g., FOOTMAN, 
footman.n.01, has two hypernyms: LIVING_ENTITY 
and CAUSAL_AGENT, both pointing to PHYSICAL_
ENTITY) as well as multiple inheritance appearing in onto-
logically incompatible branches (e.g., BLOODSTREAM, 
bloodstream.n.01, has two hypernyms: MATTER, which 
ends into PHYSICAL_ENTITY, and PART, which ends into 
ABSTRACTION).
We then compared the concreteness scores using a 
Welch’s t-test (Delacre et al. 2017) associated with the nouns 
appearing in the two branches, ABSTRACTION or PHYSI-
CAL_ENTITY, to test whether the WN-based distinction 
between abstract and concrete nouns was substantiated by 
psychological data (i.e., concreteness ratings).
Subsequently, we compared in a Welch’s t-test our meas-
ures of specificity, to test whether words that have PHYSI-
CAL_ENTITY as a hypernym (and therefore are listed as 
concrete in WN) are also significantly more specific than 
words that have ABSTRACTION as hypernym.
Results
Of the 13,518 nouns analyzed in study 1, a total of 3896 
nouns are listed in WN under the node ABSTRACTION and 
3146 under the node PHYSICAL_ENTITY. The number of 
words within one of the two branches and without multiple 
inheritances adds up to 7042. Table 2 shows the average 
concreteness scores associated with the words in these two 
samples and the results of the two Welch’s t-tests.
Table 2 shows that for the whole sample of words (first 
row), concreteness is on average slightly skewed toward the 
highly concrete end, the average of the first two measures 
corresponds to the median of the frequency distributions, 
while Specificity 3 is slightly skewed toward the highly 
generic end of the scale. In relation to the two branches 
ABSTRACTION and PHYSICAL_ENTITY in WN, the 
second and third rows of Table 2 show that these two sam-
ples encompass words designating concepts that are sig-
nificantly different in concreteness (the first branch includ-
ing concepts that are more abstract than the latter) and 
in specificity (the first branch including concepts that are 
more generic than the latter). In other words, the differ-
ences in both concreteness and specificity between words 
in the ABSTRACTION branch, and words in the PHYSI-
CAL_ENTITY branch are statistically significant for all 
considered measures.
Discussion
Words that appear under the nodes PHYSICAL_ENTITY 
and under the node ABSTRACTION in WN display sig-
nificantly different levels of concreteness, when we com-
pare them using the concreteness scores collected from 
human judgments (Brysbaert et al. 2014). In other words, 
the concepts designated by the words under the node 
PHYSICAL_ENTITY are significantly more concrete 
than the concepts designated by the words under the node 
ABSTRACTION.
12 We have explicitly excluded the other top node, THING, for the 
following reasons: It only contains 8 hyponym synsets, all at distance 
1; the set of synsets under THING is vague and may be used to refer 
to both physical and abstract concepts.
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Moreover, these two groups of words have also sig-
nificantly different levels of specificity: The words in the 
branch under PHYSICAL_ENTITY are on average signifi-
cantly more specific than the words in the branch under 
ABSTRACTION, although the differences in their aver-
ages are very small. This suggests that concepts that are 
more concrete are also more specific than concepts that are 
more abstract, which are in turn more generic.
Given the complex scenario that emerges from these 
two studies, showing that the relationship between con-
creteness and specificity is not a simple one, we decided 
to cross the two variables and observe in detail what type 
of concepts surfaces in the four quadrants of such intersec-
tion. We report our qualitative observations in Study 3.
Study 3
In this study, we crossed the variables specificity and 
concreteness, as graphically exemplified in Fig. 3, and 
analyzed the tails that we found by intersecting them, by 
gradually increasing the width of the range by 0.25 points, 
as graphically exemplified in Fig. 4. This gradual increase 
allows us to find archetypal examples of each class of con-
cepts. Furthermore, future research could expand these 
classes, e.g., by considering concreteness and specificity 
in languages other than English.
Materials and procedure
For each of the 13,518 words analyzed in Study 1, we con-
sidered its concreteness score and its specificity, calculated 
with Specificity 3, which is the measure that gave us the 
highest correlations with the concreteness ratings in Study 
1. Moreover, as described in “Specificity measures” Section, 
this measure might be less skewed than Specificity 1 and 
Specificity 2 toward the information (i.e., number of nodes) 
provided by the lower part of the taxonomy (i.e., the hypo-
nyms). Nonetheless, determining the amount of information 
that contributes to determine a word’s specificity in the mind 
of the speakers remains an open empirical question to be 
investigated by means of appropriate psycholinguistic tasks.
We started by selecting and analyzing the words that 
have scores of specificity and concreteness within the first 
and last 0.25 point range of the scale. For example, for the 
highly specific and highly concrete words we considered 
words displaying values of specificity > 4.75 and concrete-
ness ratings > 4.75.
Table 2  Average concreteness of the words appearing under the PHYSICAL_ENTITY and under the ABSTRACTION nodes in WN
Concreteness (Brys-
baert et al. 2014)
Specificity 1 Specificity 2 Specificity 3
All words (ABSTRACT + CONCRETE) (n = 7042) M = 3.450 M = 3.011 M = 3.002 M = 2.055
SD = 1.130 SD = 0.286 SD = 0.312 SD = 0.328
Words under the label ABSTRACTION in WN (n = 3896) M = 2.754 M = M = 2.947 M = 2.931 M = 1.944
SD = 0.910 SD = 0.290 SD = 0.278 SD = 0.263
Words under the label PHYSICAL_ENTITY in WN (n = 3146) M = 4.311 M = 3.089 M = 3.089 M = 2.192
SD = 0.698 SD = 0.303 SD = 0.330 SD = 0.347
 t value 81.25 20.85 21.39 33.19
 df 7022 6142 6147 5742
 p < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001
 Cohen’s d 1.920 0.504 0.517 0.807
 99% CI of Cohen’s d 1.83, 2.01 0.44, 0.57 0.45, 0.59 0.74, 0.87
Fig. 3  The intersection of the two variables, specificity and concrete-




We then enlarged our range to words that have scores of 
specificity and concreteness within the first and last 0.5 point 
range of the scale. We repeated this procedure six times, by 
gradually enlarging the size of the tails of our words distri-
butions by 0.25 points each time.
Results
The distribution of the concreteness and specificity scores 
across the four quadrants is displayed in Fig. 5.
As the plots show, most of the words appear in the lower 
two quadrants, which display concepts that are highly 
abstract and generic (bottom left), and highly concrete and 
generic (bottom right). Concrete and specific concepts are 
also well represented (top right), while abstract, but specific 
concepts are scarcely represented (top left). Overall, it can 
be argued that specificity is a property that characterizes 
concrete concepts (which can be both, specific or generic) 
more than abstract concepts (which tend to be for the large 
majority generic).
Concepts that are low in specificity and low in concreteness 
(generic and abstract)
Overall, there are no words of this kind in the last 0.5 point 
above/below the minimum/maximum of the scale (specific-
ity: 1.00 < x < 1.50 and concreteness: 1.00 < x < 1.50).
When we raised the bar by 0.25 points on both vari-
ables (specificity: 1.00 < x < 1.75 and concreteness: 
1.00 < x < 1.75), 145 words emerged in the intersection 
of the two variables,13 including absurdity, adaptability, 
ambience, ambivalence, amorality, applicability, aptitude, 
authenticity, belief, circumstances, commitment, contrary, 
desire, destiny, and idea. These words appear to denote 
archetypal abstract concepts.
By enlarging the tails of low specificity and low con-
creteness by 0.25 points at the time, this tendency seems 
Fig. 4  Graphic display showing 
how the qualitative analysis 
(Study 3) was implemented. 
The colored boxes show the 
ranges of concreteness and 
specificity scores that we 
extracted and analyzed, after 
crossing the variables concrete-
ness and specificity
Fig. 5  Plot showing the distribution of the 13,518 nouns across the 
four quadrants, obtained by crossing the variables Specificity and 
Concreteness
13 The complete list of nouns for each combination of concreteness 
and specificity is available in the linked OSF repository.
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to be confirmed. As a matter of fact, words returned within 
the ranges of specificity: 1.00 < x < 2.00 and concreteness: 
1.00 < x < 2.00 (N = 599) include, besides the words in the 
previous tails, words such as originality, future, disparity, 
simplification, wrongness, tenacity, desperation, unpopular-
ity, and criminality.
By enlarging the tails by an additional 0.25 points, the 
tendency seems to remain the same. Within the ranges of 
specificity: 1.00 < x < 2.25 and concreteness: 1.00 < x < 2.25 
(N = 1693), words such as savagery, occultism, delibera-
tion, ecstasy, cordiality, assertion, and dissemination are 
added to the pool. By enlarging the tails by an additional 
0.25 points (specificity: 1.00 < x < 2.50 and concreteness: 
1.00 < x < 2.50 (N = 2627), words such as discontinuation, 
plasticity, aesthetics, agony, prerequisite, and discomfort are 
added to the pool. Once again, at first glance, all the words 
in this intersection express genuine abstract concepts, that 
is, the archetypal types of concepts used in the literature to 
exemplify what abstract concepts are: concepts that cannot 
be directly perceived through our sensory experiences, often 
loaded with emotional information (Vigliocco et al., 2013).
Concepts that are high in specificity and low 
in concreteness (specific and abstract)
Overall, these words seem to be not well represented, in the 
tails of our specificity and concreteness distributions. This 
goes in line with the observation provided in Table 1 and 
visualized in Fig. 5, according to which the specificity values 
are skewed toward the highly generic end, while the con-
creteness values are slightly skewed toward the highly con-
crete end (bottom quadrants in Fig. 5). Therefore, it could 
be expected that there are no words in the thinnest tails of 
highly specific and highly abstract words. We found empty 
intersections until we hit the range of specificity 3.25 < x < 5 
and concreteness 1 < x < 2.75. At this level, the following 
three words emerged in the intersection of the two variables: 
cakewalk, fundamentalism, and vintage.
And by enlarging the range by an additional 0.25 points 
(specificity 3 < x < 5 and concreteness 1 < x < 3), besides 
the three words previously indicated, the following 7 words 
appeared: bootleg, finisher, general, mankind, monotheism, 
polytheism, and summons.
These words seem to be partially related to the spiritual 
domain and other specific human-born creations, thus iden-
tifying what is called social reality: specific creations shaped 
by cultural environment that emerge thanks to social interac-
tions which is distinguished from biological or individual 
cognitive reality. All these words seem to express concepts 
that are needed to humans to categorize social and cultural 
experiences and talk about concepts that exist only by virtue 
of humans being in contact with other humans. While it can 
be argued that also the generic and abstract concepts denote 
human-born creations, it appears that, being more generic, 
these are less likely to be as heavily shaped by the cultural 
and linguistic environment as the concepts that appear in 
the category specific and abstract. Concepts that are generic 
and abstract, such as IDEA, DESIRE, and BELIEF, can be 
configured into different (more specific) concepts, which are 
in turn shaped by cultural and linguistic environment. Con-
versely, concepts in the category specific and abstract (e.g., 
CAKEWALK, which denotes a traditional American dance; 
BOOTLEG, which denotes a counterfeit or unofficial prod-
uct, SUMMONS, which denotes an order to appear before a 
judge), on average appear to be notions that are already very 
much embedded in the cultural and linguistic environment 
in which they are used. This intuition suggests that concepts 
that are specific and abstract are less likely to be translat-
able into different languages, compared to concepts that are 
generic and abstract. For the purpose of this study, however, 
this remains an open empirical question to be addressed in 
further investigations.
Concepts that are high in specificity and high 
in concreteness (specific and concrete)
Within the last 1 point of the distributions, the intersection 
between highly specific and highly concrete words is empty 
(specificity 4 < x < 5 and concreteness 4 < x < 5).
Moving onto a slightly more encompassing intersection 
(specificity 3.75 < x < 5 and concreteness 3.75 < x < 5), a 
sample of 10 words is returned. Interestingly, this sample 
includes a good number of words related to chemicals and 
other substances: karaoke, epinephrine, aspirin, heifer, tri-
glyceride, glucose, chloroform, fructose, and petroleum.
When the sample is enlarged by 0.25 points (specificity 
3.50 < x < 5 and concreteness 3.50 < x < 5), a larger sample 
is returned (N = 174), belonging to a wide variety of seman-
tic domains, including animals (antelope, bison, cat), food 
(bread, grape, pear), types of people (priest, physician, 
parent), and tools (scalpel, scissors, knife). These seem to 
reflect the typical categories in which we classify prototypi-
cal concrete concepts, i.e., concepts that designate tangible 
referents.
Concepts that are low in specificity and high 
in concreteness (generic and concrete)
There are only three words of this kind if we consider the 
last 0.5 point above/below the minimum/maximum of the 
scale (specificity 1 < x < 1.50, concreteness 4.50 < x < 5). 
These are ground, people and ribbon.
When we raised the bar by 0.25 points on both variables 
(specificity 1 < x < 1.75, concreteness 4.25 < x < 5), 273 
words emerge from the intersection of the two variables, 
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including: seafood, ashes, breath, cloth, college, daytime, 
fabric, and forest.
Many of these words, interestingly, are mass nouns, and 
thus denote referents that do not have clear-cut boundaries 
or shapes.
Finally, by raising the bar to words within the range of 
specificity 1 < x < 2 and concreteness 4 < x < 5, we obtain an 
extensive list of words (N = 783) belonging to several seman-
tic domains, such as locations (bank, beach, coast), events 
(ballgame, birth, explosion), materials (cashmere, flannel, 
plastics), and other mass nouns (crowd, herd, potpourri).
Discussion
Through a qualitative analysis of the words denoting con-
crete and specific, concrete and generic, abstract and con-
crete, and abstract and generic concepts, we observe some 
tendencies that we hereby summarize.
First, the prototypical abstract concepts, which are tradi-
tionally mentioned to exemplify what abstract concepts are, 
seem to be highly generic as well. In other words, when we 
refer to abstract concepts as concepts that cannot be directly 
perceived through our sensory experiences, because they 
lack a perceptible referent in the world, we refer to concepts 
that are also quite generic, in terms of conceptual (categori-
cal) abstraction.
Second, there is another type of concepts that score low 
in concreteness, and are therefore abstract concepts, but 
also quite specific, in terms of categorical level of abstrac-
tion. These words, which in our study relate mainly to the 
spiritual domain or to the socio-political one, belong to 
social reality, which describes phenomena that would not 
exist independently of the attitudes of people toward them. 
Such phenomena depend on our mind to exist, but emerge 
thanks to social interactions with other human beings, and 
are therefore distinguished from both biological reality and 
individual cognitive reality.
Third, the prototypical concrete concepts, which are tra-
ditionally mentioned to exemplify what concrete concepts 
are, seem to be also highly specific. In other words, when we 
refer to concrete concepts as concepts that can be directly 
perceived through our sensory experiences because they des-
ignate tangible referents in the world, we refer to concepts 
that are also quite specific, in terms of categorical level of 
abstraction.
Fourth, there seems to be a type of concrete concepts 
which are also quite generic in terms of conceptual (categori-
cal) abstraction. These concepts seem to include several mass 
nouns, or uncountable nouns, and therefore denote concrete 
referents in the world that do not have clearly defined bounda-
ries. Interestingly, Markman (1985) offers a functional expla-
nation as to why generic category terms as furniture, jewelry, 
and money tend to be mass nouns although they refer to classes 
of (diverse) concrete objects. The author explains that mass 
terms typically refer to mass-like relatively homogeneous 
substances, such as milk or sand. However, on the basis of 
research contrasting collective and count nouns, she argues 
that by using mass nouns to refer to superordinate categories 
(furniture, jewelry) languages could help speakers learn the 
hierarchical relations between superordinate and lower-level 
categories.
These concepts (concrete but generic) have a peculiar rela-
tion to the structure of conceptual metaphors, which we shall 
spell out. An important goal ascribed to concrete concepts 
is that they can be used as source domains to metaphorize 
more abstract concepts. For instance, conceptual metaphor 
theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) proposed that abstract con-
cepts (e.g., LIFE) are typically understood metaphorically 
through more concrete concepts (e.g., JOURNEY). Burgers 
and Ahrens (in press) recently reported on a study of meta-
phors for the concept TRADE in a corpus of 225 years of 
State of the Union speeches delivered by US presidents. They 
found that metaphors for TRADE that drew from concepts that 
were concrete but generic were likeliest to be used over a long 
period of time. After all, these concepts were concrete and 
could thus be used for sense-making of a relatively abstract 
concept like trade. Furthermore, the genericity of these con-
cepts also made them more adaptable to changing situational 
circumstances than more specific concepts. Similarly, some of 
the generic-concrete words found in our analysis are also used 
often as metaphorical source domains. The prime example is 
people, as metaphors ascribing human characteristics to non-
human entities (known as “anthropomorphism” or “personi-
fication”) are often used in discourse (e.g., Dorst 2011; Epley 
et al. 2008).
To conclude, this preliminary qualitative exploration of the 
concepts that appear in the four quadrants obtained by crossing 
concreteness with specificity suggests that a further, more sys-
tematic empirical analysis is needed to clarify whether these 
four groups are substantially different from one another, and 
whether other differences (than abstractness and specificity) 
may hold between them. For example, it could be interesting 
to explore whether the differences between superordinate and 
basic-level categories reported in the literature for concrete 
concepts hold for abstract concepts as well.
General discussion
In the Introduction to our study, we formulated our first 
research question as follows:




In Study 1, we showed a medium–low significant cor-
relation between the two variables of Concreteness (which 
measures concepts on a scale that goes from highly con-
crete to highly abstract) and Specificity (which measures 
concepts on a scale that goes from highly specific to highly 
generic) that can be mapped to the notions of Abstractness 
and Abstraction, following the terminology adopted by 
Borghi and Binkofski 2014. However, we also acknowl-
edged that WN presents some problematic issues that affect 
the analyses of categorical specificity. Notably, some words 
in WN have multiple inheritances (i.e., the same word 
sense has multiple hypernyms) which in the hierarchy of 
the WN taxonomy end up on different root nodes. Among 
these root nodes, and therefore still at a very generic level, 
WN distinguishes between ABSTRACTION and PHYSI-
CAL_ENTITY, which seems to be a distinction highly con-
nected to our variable Concreteness. Some words appear 
within both of these branches, because they have multiple 
hypernyms that follow different routes to the top of the WN 
taxonomy. This suggests that even though we used the same 
word sense for these words (as listed in WN), these words 
still conflate different meanings, and designate different 
referents, which in some cases differ in terms of concrete-
ness. Reijnierse et al. (2019) claim that this specific type of 
polysemy, for which a meaning is significantly more con-
crete than another, is peculiar of metaphoricity and char-
acterize words that have a literal meaning (typically more 
concrete, e.g., support: physical tool like a wooden board) 
and a derived, metaphorical one (typically more abstract, 
e.g., support: psychological help).
Our second RQ was formulated as follows:
RQ2: To which extent does the distinction between 
abstract and concrete entities in the WordNet (WN, 
henceforth) taxonomy (Fellbaum 1998) reflect the con-
creteness perceived by speakers? And if the WN-based 
distinction between abstract and concrete is backed up by 
participants’ judgments, do the words within these two 
WN branches display statistically significant differences 
in their average degree of specificity?
In Study 2, we recast our analyses. On the one hand, we 
exploited the distinction between physical and abstract enti-
ties featured in WN and, on the other hand, we excluded all 
words that have multiple inheritance. We then tested whether 
the words within each of these two branches of the WN tax-
onomy designate concepts that are, on average, significantly 
different in terms of concreteness and in terms of specificity. 
We found that words that appear in the WN branch under 
the node ABSTRACTION are significantly less concrete and 
less specific than the words that appear in the WN branch 
under the node PHYSICAL_ENTITY. The correlation coef-
ficients between specificity and concreteness within each of 
the two branches increased, compared to the results obtained 
in Study 1.
Finally, our third RQ was formulated as follows:
RQ3: What type of concepts can be found in the four 
intersections of the two variables, specificity and con-
creteness?
In Study 3, we provided a qualitative analysis of the 
words that appear to be highly concrete and highly specific, 
highly concrete and highly generic, highly abstract and 
highly specific, and highly abstract and highly generic. We 
observed that while abstract and generic words designate 
prototypical abstract concepts, which are likely to be loaded 
with emotional information, abstract and specific words des-
ignate specific concepts within the social reality domains. 
Moreover, while concrete and specific words designate pro-
totypical concrete concepts, belonging to several domains 
such as animals, food, and tools, concrete and generic con-
cepts appear to include a variety of mass nouns, and to be in 
general good candidates as source domains in metaphorical 
comparisons.
This study aimed at disentangling and clarifying the rela-
tion between specificity and concreteness, two variables that 
get often conflated when referring to the general phenom-
enon of abstraction. We showed that such relationship is far 
from being trivial. Specificity and concreteness appear to 
be mildly correlated: They do not go hand in hand. Cross-
ing the two variables, we obtained words that seem to des-
ignate qualitatively different concepts, in the four derived 
quadrants.
Within the cognitive sciences, our findings can be inter-
preted as follows. Starting from the buzzy world of percep-
tual experiences, on the one hand we have the construction 
of conceptual categories that vary in terms of granularity 
(categorical abstraction from specific to generic). On the 
other hand, we have the construction of conceptual repre-
sentations, some referring to what can be directly perceived 
through perceptual experiences, some referring to intangible 
entities (conceptual representation of abstractness/concrete-
ness). In this sense, the two variables, specificity and con-
creteness, might identify two phenomena that differ in the 
way concepts get access to the designated referents in the 
world. In particular, specificity might characterize the way 
in which concepts get access to the referents via language, 
while concreteness might characterize the way in which 
concepts get access to the referents via mental representa-
tions. Moreover, specificity is measured as a characteristic 
(which we operationalized through WN), while concreteness 
is measured as a perception variable (which is commonly 
operationalized through concreteness ratings). Therefore, 
they constitute two distinct types of variables as well.
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Some caveats need to be discussed, in relation to our 
findings, which are based on WN and the concreteness rat-
ings paradigm. First, WN is a lexicon that has been used in 
a variety of studies and works. Nevertheless, this resource 
has been created and conceived with some psycholinguistic 
assumptions, especially as far as its taxonomy is concerned 
(see Miller 1998 for a detailed illustration of the modeling 
principles of the noun taxonomy). This can have an impact 
in the results that may be obtained when applied in other 
contexts. For instance, multiple inheritance in WN is pre-
sented and justified as way of modeling different meanings 
of the hyponym/hypernym relations (Miller 1998). Thus, 
multiple inheritance in WN seems very useful if someone 
wants to study the continuum between abstract and concrete 
nouns and investigate whether some modeling decisions are 
reflected by human judgments. For our study, multiple inher-
itance, especially when it involves incompatible ontological 
categories, is a source of noise and breaks some assump-
tions related to the use of taxonomies to represent nominal 
meanings.
Second, the WN noun taxonomy and its sense repository 
(synsets) are very fine-grained. Some studies have criticized 
this fine grained-ness representation, especially for appli-
cative goals (Weischedel et al. 2011). In addition to this, 
senses in WN do not have any specific order. However, as 
an effort to include more contextual information in WN, 
there have been initiatives on manually annotating corpora 
with WN synsets (Miller et al. 1993, Ide, 2012, among oth-
ers). This has resulted in the possibility of “re-ordering” 
some senses in WN according to their frequencies in these 
annotated corpora. Nevertheless, the texts composing these 
corpora may have biased the ordering of the senses. For 
instance, the noun tablespoon is associated with a synset 
composed of the synsets words “tablespoon, tablespoonful.” 
The noun tablespoonful has been annotated in the SemCor 
Corpus (Miller et al. 1993) with the meaning of “as much 
as a tablespoon will hold.” On the other hand, the meaning 
“a spoon larger than a dessert spoon; used for serving” of 
tablespoon has never been annotated. It follows that the first 
sense of tablespoon in WN is “as much as a tablespoon will 
hold,” and such sense belongs to the branch under the node 
ABSTRACTION.
Finally, in relation to the concreteness ratings that we 
used (Brysbaert et al. 2014) it shall be mentioned that these 
types of ratings, largely used in cognitive science and cogni-
tive psychology to operationalize conceptual concreteness, 
are typically collected by presenting words to participants, 
without providing any context that could help the partici-
pants disambiguating potential polysemic words. Therefore, 
participants submitted to rate the concreteness of, for exam-
ple, support, as described above, may in principle rate either 
the concrete or the abstract (figurative) sense of this word, 
especially given the fact that they are both frequently used 
word senses. This problem relates to the multiple inheritance 
problem that characterizes WN.
Conclusion and outlook
In this work, we have investigated the relationship between 
concreteness and specificity looking for empirical evidence 
that may support the hypothesis that generic categories (i.e., 
low in specificity) are less rich in perceptual features, and 
therefore more abstract. Results seem to point out that these 
two variables capture theoretically distinct concepts, that 
can be crossed and give rise to sub-types of words. If such 
distinction of concreteness and specificity as independent 
theoretical notions is accepted, as a consequence the con-
struct of “abstraction” needs to be revised as well.
Abstraction is a polysemic word that can be used to define 
the extraction of information from perceptual experiences to 
construct and label with words semantically coherent cat-
egories at various levels of granularity (e.g., TABLE, FUR-
NITURE, ENTITY), as well as the construction of mental 
representations that group together various experiences on 
the basis of some type of perceived similarity between them 
(e.g., TABLE, DEBATE, JUSTICE). These two meanings 
refer to what in cognitive science is usually referred to as 
the difference between a concept (a mental representation 
of classes of things) and a category (referring the labeled 
classes themselves) (e.g., Murphy 2002), although such dis-
tinction is not free from critiques.
Consider the three pillars around which much of the 
cognitive scientific work revolves, and the mutual relations 
between them: thought, language, and world. The process of 
categorical abstraction thanks to which we construct the cat-
egory TABLE from individual instances that we can directly 
experience (e.g., your kitchen table) and the category FUR-
NITURE by grouping together tables, chairs and couches, is 
a process in which language allows us to glue together indi-
vidual experiences—and label them with a word. The vari-
able that we called specificity therefore describes how per-
ceptual experiences derived from the world are categorized 
by language. Conversely, conceptual concreteness describes 
how perceptual experiences derived from the world are cat-
egorized by thought, to construct mental representations. 
If this is the case, abstraction needs to be investigated in a 
cross-disciplinary manner: Linguists, communication sci-
entists, psychologists, cognitive scientists, and computer 
scientists need to be working together, use a shared termi-
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